What I Am Reading: "1932: The Rise of Hitler and FDR" by David Pietrusza

This was yet another popular history, but it was one by an author who clearly loves elections. David Pietrusza also wrote 1920: The Year of the Six Presidents, about the 1920 Presidential Election, and 1948 about Harry Truman's surprise win, and others. I knew going in that his writing would be somewhat informal and somewhat sensationalized, though the author also has a clear mastery of the facts, and brings a lot to the table for those with a background in whatever he is writing about. He also says “hung” instead of “hanged” when referring to the execution. Despite these misgivings, I couldn't pass up the chance to read about the 1932 German elections: a two-round Presidential election between Hitler and Hindenburg, and the last two Reichstag elections of the Weimar Republic.

I've read a handful of Weimar books (shout out of course to Benjamin Carter Hett), but for now I’m just going to give just a brief overview of where Germany stood in 1932: the country recovered from postwar hyperinflation only long enough to be wiped out again by the Great Depression, and the electorate was turning to more radical solutions after years of misery. The Nazis had steadily risen in their membership and electoral totals, and Hitler sought to capitalize on that by running as a candidate in the March 1932 Presidential Election. The center left improbably rallied around incumbent President Paul von Hindenburg, an aristocratic monarchist, from a Prussian military background, in his eighties, who was outright hostile to the republic's resistance. Hindenburg allowed himself to be persuaded to run, and was forced into a second round by Hitler, with a first-round result of 49% for Hindenburg, 30% for Hitler, 13% for Ernst Thälmann, the Communist candidate, and almost 7% for Theodor Duesterberg, another right-wing candidate (of the Stahlhelm, a veterans' organization). Despite Nazi ambitions of a sweep, Hindenburg won the runoff 53% to 36%, with 10% to the Communists. From a poli sci perspective, this election is interesting because the electoral coalition backing Hindenburg was flipped from that backing him for his first election in 1925, as his veteran and agrarian voters went for Hitler (another interesting point is that the fanatical Communists actually lost votes between election rounds as their voters apparently opted for pragmatism). Anyway, despite this loss, the Nazis were able to capitalize on their momentum in the July parliamentary elections, and doubled their seat count to become the largest party. However, their intriguing failed to carry them to power, as the government (with no Reichstag majority coalition forthcoming) continued to be run by a small, unelected clique acceptable to Hindenburg and ruling by Presidential decree; with dashing, supercilious former cavalry officer Franz von Papen as Chancellor. The strings were pulled by Gen. Kurt von Schleicher, a sort of legislative liaison of the military who saw himself as a puppetmaster. Trying again to break the logjam keeping them from power, the Nazis arranged, with Schleicher's connivance, the downfall of von Papen: a lightweight liked only by Hindenburg. This triggered an election, and afterword Schleicher became Chancellor.

Late 1932 was when the Nazis stalled out to some extent: after toppling von Papen, they lost ground in the resulting Reichstag election, and Hitler was trapped between a rowdy and radical base who were tired of feigning respectability in the name of achieving power, and an establishment that wasn't quite there yet in terms of offering that power to him. However, Schleicher, a man with his own vision for a post-Weimar regime of military dictatorship, overplayed his hand when he made some utilitarian left pronouncements and pursued an investigation into agricultural subsidies that could have embarrassed a lot of East Prussian welfare Junkers. Hitler teamed up with von Papen (a political move so unwise that von Papen would be tried at Nuremburg to answer for it) and became Chancellor in early 1933 after Hindenburg's begrudging acceptance.

The other half of the story is that of Franklin Roosevelt's pursuit of the Presidency in 1932, as he navigated the shifting sands of Democratic party politics. The book has a lot of content on his feuds with Al Smith, his predecessor as New York Governor and the Democratic Party nominee in 1928. It has a habit of highlighting Roosevelt's underhandedness and occasional shallowness as he plays all sides during his ascent; grubby politcking that I think makes his later stands on principle and his human resource stubbornness all the more remarkable (though he ran a famously philosophically- and administratively-freewheeling administration and tried to keep all options open for as long as he could). There is a lot of exploration of side-stories such as Roosevelt’s decision to deal with the corrupt Mayor of New York, and embrace Tammany Hall or betray it. This is mostly just political tale-telling, but it is all part of the mosaic of Roosevelt’s election (admittedly a mosaic focusing on the elite power players and less so on the voters).

This is my own brief summary, augmented (obviously) by having just read a book on the subject. I will have my thirst for more sober fare slaked, I hope, by soon acquiring an academic book on Prussia in the Weimar era; this subject is always my favorite when it shows up in a longer history. Despite the chaos of the national government, with constant changeover in Chancellors. There were three in 1932 alone, as the year started with Zentrum (Catholic centrist party) Chancellor Heinrich Brüning, the "Hunger Chancellor" who tried to steer the ship of state through the depression, and was sacked by Hindenburg for putting him through the rigors of the campaign trail. In contrast to this instability, the largest German state, Prussia, had the same premier, Otto Braun, for twelve years, from 1920 to 1932. Braun was able to keep the pro-democracy parties, the "Weimar Coalition" as some say, together on the provincial level even as it split on the national level, and governed backed by the SPD (Social Democrats), Zentrum, and DDP (German Democratic Party, a left-liberal party). One reason I have read for this is that the national-level Social Democrats were mostly journalists (therefore ideologues) with Parliamentary experience during the Wilhelmine years, therefore psychologically conditioned to the opposition experience; whereas the Prussian deputies didn't have that previous experience, and were made up of more practical union officials. Anyway, this left/democratic control of Prussia was important because as the largest state, Prussia possessed a police force almost as large as the circumscribed German army, and considerable economic and industrial policymaking power. During his term, in between tax cuts and unemployment benefit cuts, Franz von Papen seized upon unrest caused by the KPD (Communist Party) to have Hindenburg decree an end to the Prussian government, launching a legal coup, known as the Preußenschlag, that replaced the elected government with his own appointed commission. The Braun government had already lost its majority in the Landtag, but held on to power by virtue of its Communist and Nazi opponents' inability to form a functioning coalition. Pietrusza paints a pathetic picture of the SPD at its ouster, particularly of Braun's number-two man, Interior Minister Carl Severing. On July 20th, von Papen summoned Severing to a meeting, and

"informed them that Hindenburg had appointed him Reich Commissioner for Prussia, supplanting their government, an authority Hindenburg's predecessor, the Social Democrat Friedrich Ebert, had exercised in 1932 to restore order in Saxony. "No, Herr Chancellor," Severing responded, "I am not going to [obey] (sic). I'll only yield to force."

"What form of force do you desire?" Papen asked, and Severing supposedly answered, "You're mistaken, Herr Chancellor. This is not a question of appearance, but of right."...

If only Severing exhibited such valor. Within a few hours ...Gen. Gerd von Rundstedt phoned Prussian police chief Grzesinski to confirm his government's ouster. Soon Papen's henchman... arrived at Severing's office by motorcycle. Severing requested [him] not to apply any force at 6:00 PM - he had a conference scheduled for that hour. "At what time, Minister," [the henchman] had famously inquired, "do you instruct force to be applied to yourself?"

Two police officers carried Severing - and the chair he sat in - out of the room... Carl Severing might have sounded the alarm for his police. They would have acted. It broke their heart not to. Some called out Freiheit! ("Freedom!"), the SPD's slogan, to encourage their leaders. Tears filled their eyes as they helplessly stood by. Severing might have sealed off [the boulevard]. He - and his party - did nothing but mutter increasingly hollow words against "the misgovernment of the barons and their National Socialist helpers." (p. 231).

During one history class in high school, when we covered Gov. Sam Houston's opposition to Texas' secession in 1861, I remember wondering why he didn't do something like barricade himself in his office in the face of removal. When asked what that would have accomplished, I said that "he could have at least made them kill him." I always had a favorable impression of Carl Severing, and it is possible that that will be rehabilitated by my Prussian reading. He and Otto Braun held things together through chaos for a long time, much longer than the three years we have been wearing ourselves out living through the current administration. Even still, I can't help but want to reach back through history to grab Severing (or Chamberlain, or Daladier, or even Beneš) by the lapels and shake them, and tell them to go down fighting, because it can't possibly be worse than what will happen if they fail to act. This is a common urge, it seems, among historians.

I learned a few other interesting things from this book, which I'll note in brief: apparently Herbert Hoover during his Presidential administration pursued a couple of proto-Nixonian strategies, including using government resources to spy on the Democrats, and a "southern strategy" of scaling back traditional Republican support for southern African Americans in favor of patronage and policies meant to win white votes. Despite the grips of the Depression, both parties had a strong focus on Prohibition policies in their convention maneuvering, described as "fighting the last war." Some of the wannabe-fuhrers from Hitler's American Friends make an appearance, as well as some new ones such as Howard Scott of the extra-crackpot Technocracy Movement, and Walter "Hot" Waters of the Bonus Army that marched on Washington to have their WW1 bonus paid out early as a form of stimulus. This movement grew more radical as it camped (before it was dispersed, according to Pietrusza, without casualties), and Waters formed a "Khaki Shirt" legion reminiscent, of course, of the fascists. I’ll have to circle back to Gore Vidal on that one. Finally, for fun, I'll note that the German Reichstag also had a fun tradition where the opening speech was given by the oldest member, and the new Reichstag in August 1932 was addressed by Klara Zetkin, an elderly Communist, born 1857, who gave a speech denouncing the Nazis and their traditionally conservative and authoritarian enablers.

For a rollicking election book, this is tied less to current events than many of the recently-published history books I've read. I'll just close by repeating Klara Zetkin’s point, more explicit in other works: the Nazis weren't swept into power on a wave of popular support. In their last election in 1932, they lost votes and seats, and it is not inconceivable that their support would have ebbed as the German situation dragged on. Pietruaza points out that they were a coalition based on opposition to the current circumstances, and without a positive platform this is eventually an untenable situation. It was the behind-the-scenes machinations of von Papen, who hated Hitler less than Schleicher, and Schleicher, who hated Hitler less than von Papen, who sealed the final deal. It was also von Papen's authoritarian instincts that overthrew the Prussian government, as you will fortunately get to hear more about in future posts. The Nazis were boosted over the top by the institutional right-wing support of large landowners and industrialists, and the politicians they owned. Elections might be fun (and don't get me wrong, they are), but they have consequences.